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Air Power in Interagency Operations 
James S. Corum 
 
Interagency operations have become a major feature of modern conflict. Throughout the Cold 
War, and especially since the terror attacks of 9/11, the United States and other Western 
nations have faced an array of unconventional threats and enemies that cannot be effectively 
countered and defeated by conventional military organisations and methods. 
Air power has played a key role in fighting unconventional enemies and in supporting 
Western nations’ own unconventional forces. However, non-conventional conflicts require 
organisations and doctrines that include personnel and resources outside the military forces 
and organisations that have evolved over the last sixty years. Interagency organisations 
contain a mix of civilian and military personnel who focus on a specific mission. A true 
interagency organisation is not just a military organisation with civilian employees, but is 
organised into groups and teams based on function and expertise in which personnel from 
military and civilian agencies are fully integrated, with civilians routinely supervising 
military personnel and vice-versa. Over time Western nations have developed integrated 
civilian-military organisations for unconventional conflict, such as the British committee 
system developed during the Malaya counterinsurgency effort (1948‒1957), in which 
military and civilian personnel working together coordinated the counterinsurgency effort 
with great success. However, a long evolution was required to reach an interagency system 
and the United States, with its large forces and resources, has been the major Western power 
to employ the interagency concept as a major tool on conflict. In recent years the best 
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example of using the interagency approach has been the United States’ development of the 
Interagency Task Force, an organisation that plays a central role in current conflicts. 
This chapter examines the evolution of the interagency concept in modern conflict 
and the role that air power has played in interagency operations. It examines the beginnings 
of air power operations in partnership with civilian agencies in the Cold War that set an early 
model for the US Air Force (USAF). The interagency concept evolved during the Vietnam 
War, which saw the first true interagency operations, and was revived to deal with irregular 
threats to the United States in the war on drugs in the 1990s. Finally, the interagency 
construct has become an indispensable organisation for waging modern conflict and in each 
step of the evolution of the concept the role of air power has expanded. 
 
Cold War: air power support to intelligence agencies 
Air Force support to intelligence operations conducting clandestine operations was the 
foundation of the early interagency operations. In 1943 General Eisenhower, then Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean, directed the US Army Air Forces 
(USAAF) to allocate a small number of bombers and transports to support the resistance 
forces inside occupied Europe. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which directed 
support to anti-Nazi partisans mainly in France, Italy, and Yugoslavia, required aircraft that 
could penetrate German-controlled airspace at night and parachute agents and commando 
teams to work with partisan forces. At times, transport planes would land on rough, 
clandestine airfields behind the lines to deliver personnel, arms, and supplies. These secret 
operations required specially trained aircrew as well as modifications to aircraft. To fly alone 
and at night, and to find drop zones and clandestine airfields (usually, farm fields marked 
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with lights and small fires) required exceptional piloting and navigational skills (Moore 
1992). 
From these small beginnings, the USAAF in Europe eventually fielded a specialist 
wing of 100 aircraft to support OSS operations behind enemy lines throughout southern and 
western Europe. The greatest success of the ‘Carpetbagger’ operations in support of the 
resistance forces was in supplying and supporting the French resistance in the summer of 
1944. The resistance fighters were assisted by small teams of Allied officers and non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) who trained the resistance fighters and provided vital liaison. 
As the Allies fought in Normandy thousands of German troops, including whole divisions, 
were tied up in fighting the well-supplied French resistance forces in the highlands of south 
central and eastern France. Resistance units also caused havoc with German road and rail 
communications (Moore 1992). Across the world in the Burma Theater the USAAF created a 
similar organisation, the 1st Air Commando Wing, that supported the anti-Japanese Burmese 
guerrillas deep behind enemy lines.  
During the 1944‒45 Allied campaign in Burma the air-supplied and -supported 
guerrilla forces disrupted enemy operations and tied down thousands of Japanese who would 
otherwise have been deployed against the Allied forces fighting their way into Burma 
(Y’Blood 2014). In neither case were the air-supported irregular forces a decisive factor in 
the campaigns, but in both cases these forces made a significant contribution to the Allied 
victories by disrupting enemy logistics and diverting enemy forces. Despite their success, at 
the end of World War II these highly specialised air units were disbanded. However, they 
were soon revived with the onset of the Korean War and the rise of the Soviet threat in 
Europe, which demonstrated a clear need for the Air Force to assist the civilian intelligence 
agencies to carry out their clandestine operations.  
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The United States created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) out of the 
intelligence agencies formed in World War II in the grand reorganisation of the American 
national security system in 1947. The Air Force, which was established as an independent 
service in 1947, already had a history of providing specialised air support to the OSS, the 
forerunner to the CIA, during World War II. In the early Cold War period of the 1950s, the 
USAF and CIA developed a close partnership in order to conduct unconventional operations 
against Communist states. While not a true interagency model in the current sense, the work 
of the Air Force in partnering with a civilian agency was an important and essential step in 
the development of the interagency system used today. 
During the Korean War the USAF’s special operations force, modeled on the special 
operations groups formed in World War II, was substantially increased. In the aftermath of 
the Korean War the US military again reduced the special operations forces, but still 
maintained a few small and highly secret Air Force units organised to conduct special 
operations missions for the CIA. At a time when the USAF was oriented around nuclear-
capable bombers such as the B-52 and was rapidly developing an intercontinental nuclear 
missile force, at the other end of the spectrum in the 1950s and 1960s the US Air Force 
special operations units operated some highly specialised but low-technology equipment such 
as the SA-16 Albatross flying boat, a simple radial-engine aircraft that cruised at 140 knots, 
but also had an endurance of sixteen hours and was capable of landing on small bodies of 
water. With the waters and airspace of the Warsaw Pact countries closely guarded and the 
land borders heavily mined and patrolled the Albatross flying boat, painted black for night 
operations and with the exhaust shielded to reduce engine flame, offered the best means of 
infiltrating agents and exfiltrating defectors and agents from behind the Iron Curtain. One 
account of these Cold War operations describes a typical operation of the 1950s in which an 
SA-16 Albartross flew in low under Soviet radar in order to land at night on an isolated lake 
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in the Balkans to pick up and drop off agents. Such operations continued into the 1960s with 
the Soviets not suspecting that their airspace was being invaded by the CIA/USAF (Haas 
1997: 119‒120). The success of the special operations airmen in penetrating Soviet-
controlled airspace is a testament to the exceptional piloting and navigation training of the 
small special operations forces. 
During the Cold War one of the most difficult of the USAF special operations with 
the CIA was the campaign to support the Tibetan guerrilla army that waged a decade-long 
war to oppose the Chinse invasion of their country which began in 1950. This operation was 
highly sensitive in that the CIA and US Air Force had to use bases in allied nations such as 
Thailand and the mission required overflying neutral countries such as Burma and Nepal. 
Supporting the Tibetan guerrilla army, which grew to an 80,000-man force, required 
exceptionally long-range flights over some of the worst terrain in the world. The region 
between Thailand and Tibet was largely unmapped jungle and mountains. The area was also 
beset by sudden storms that hit with terrific force. Because the operation was so sensitive and 
secret there could be no network of emergency airfields, nor could the USAF mount a search 
and rescue effort if a plane went down. Of course, there were no navigation aids to help the 
American airmen navigate over endless jungle and then over some of the highest mountains 
in the world. 
The Tibetan operation revolved around flying arms and supplies to the guerrillas as 
well as flying back to Tibet guerrillas who had undergone training in secret US military 
facilities outside Tibet. The initial missions to supply the Tibetans used the C-118 transport: a 
good plane for the time but with a relatively small payload, which limited the supplies and 
arms that could be flown into Tibet. In 1957 the USAF assigned some C-124 Globemaster 
transports to fly to Tibet and fly out Tibetans for guerrilla training. The USAF dramatically 
improved its ability to support the Tibetans when some of the first models of the C-130 
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transport were assigned to the special operations forces for the Tibetan mission. With the C-
130 the special operations units supporting the CIA-led effort had an aircraft with the 
performance and payload to be truly effective.  
The year 1959 saw one of the most dramatic episodes of the CIA/USAF operation 
when the US-trained Tibetan guerrillas (who had been flown back to Tibet after training 
outside the country) helped the legitimate spiritual and state leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, 
to escape the careful watch of the Chinese Army and make his way for hundreds of miles 
through tortuous mountain passes to the Indian border. The Dalai Lama was guarded by the 
US-trained and equipped guerrillas and he and his escort were sustained by supply drops by 
the C-130s that enabled his successful escape from the communists (Haas 1994: 28‒31). 
The Tibetan operation ended in May 1960 when a large force of the Chinese Army 
was deployed to Tibet to crush the insurgency. The Chinese pressure against the Tibetans 
became so overwhelming that continuing the resistance against the Chinese invaders was 
considered hopeless (Haas 1994: 31). Still, for a decade the CIA/ USAF partnership played a 
key role in enabling the Tibetan resistance. The Tibet operation, more than any other Cold 
War operation, demonstrated the ability of the USAF to support the clandestine operations of 
the intelligence service, even under incredibly difficult conditions. Remarkably, the USAF 
lost no transport aircraft during the Tibetan operation. The loss of any transport would have 
resulted in a diplomatic incident with several countries. This amazing record is testimony to 
the exceptional planning and training of the small USAF special operations units.   
 
Vietnam: the first true interagency operations 
The Vietnam War pushed the concept of interagency operations to a new level. In Vietnam, 
the United States found itself fighting two wars: both of which it had to win. The first war 
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was against the conventional forces of North Vietnam, and required the military services to 
fight the kind of battles for which they were trained and equipped. The second war was 
broader, and harder to define. This was the war against the Viet Cong guerrillas, who lived 
and operated among the mainly rural population of South Vietnam. While the Viet Cong had 
a cadre of full-time leaders and some regular forces, many of the Viet Cong were part-time 
guerrillas who carried on their lives as peasants, but were also ready to conduct small-scale 
operations: setting ambushes, deploying booby traps, assassinating government officials, and 
harassing the government troops. The Viet Cong operated in a largely friendly environment 
with many South Vietnamese willing to provide the Viet Cong with information, food, and 
shelter. Other South Vietnamese were coerced into paying taxes and providing supplies to the 
Viet Cong. 
While the conventional war against the North Vietnamese was the main focus of the 
US military, defeating the Viet Cong required a host of non-military resources focused on 
supporting the South Vietnamese civil government in the rural areas. The US campaign in the 
countryside included executing aid programs to improve farming and small business, 
advising and supporting the South Vietnamese civil agencies, providing basic services and 
medical care, improving the local infrastructure, and conducting a pro-government 
propaganda campaign. The US aid programs required civilian expertise and leadership, which 
they found in civilian agencies such as the US State Department, the CIA, and the US 
Information Agency. At the same time, the civilians had to work closely with the corps of 
military advisors who were responsible for standing up and training the South Vietnamese 
local security forces. 
By 1967, with the conventional military effort in South Vietnam expanding, the war 
against the Viet Cong was going poorly. The Viet Cong, who had created a very effective 
shadow government, was rapidly expanding its recruitment and influence. The weakness of 
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the South Vietnamese government and its police and local self-defence forces allowed the 
Viet Cong to effectively control large parts of the countryside (Hunt 1995: 6‒7).  
The US military leadership under command of General Westmoreland (Commander, 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)) understood that the military was unsuited 
to coordinating a mainly civilian-focused effort in the countryside. The answer to the problem 
was provided by a senior CIA officer, Robert W. Komer, who proposed a single agency 
combining military and civilian personnel to manage the American support of the South 
Vietnamese in the countryside. In 1967 the United States created CORDS (Civil Operations 
and Revolutionary Development Support), with Komer as director. At every level the rural 
pacification effort would be under one person, with civilian and military personnel 
intermixed. CORDS developed into a highly effective interagency organisation to support the 
South Vietnamese effort in the countryside. The agency came to oversee the South 
Vietnamese regional forces, psychological operations, public administration, and rural health 
care. The CORDS program, through effective coordination of effort, played a central role in 
breaking the power of the Viet Cong in the countryside. Viet Cong membership declined 
between 1968 and 1972, and the Viet Cong in guerrilla units declined from 77,000 in January 
1968 to 25,000 in May 1972 (Hunt 1995: 252‒253). As the Viet Cong declined, the 
government presence in the countryside improved, as did the security and living standards of 
the rural population.  
Creating CORDS was no easy process, and the CORDS organisation exhibited 
problems that would bedevil all interagency organisations that came after. In eessence, 
CORDS was more of a coordination system than an independent agency, since it did not have 
its own resources. The State Department provided personnel and funding via its aid budget, 
and the military provided personnel, equipment, and funding for programs to develop the 
local South Vietnamese security forces. The CIA provided personnel as well. Considerable 
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friction occurred at first in an organisation where many State Department and CIA civilians 
came under the direct command of military officers, while many military personnel ended up 
being commanded by civilians. However, Robert Komer proved an effective leader and made 
the new organisation work. 
During the critical period after the Tet Offensive, CORDS took over the entire effort 
to develop and train the South Vietnamese regional and part-time forces tasked with local 
security in the rural effort. This included managing the advisory effort and working with 
South Vietnamese officials at every level. It was a difficult task in that the CORDS personnel 
could influence the South Vietnamese, yet not directly command them. Still, the effectiveness 
of CORDS in carrying out its mission cannot be denied. In the years 1968 until the American 
departure from Vietnam in 1973, the security situation in the countryside dramatically 
improved. In the spring of 1972, when the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) mounted a major 
offensive, the South Vietnamese regional forces, trained and advised by CORDS personnel, 
performed far better than they had during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Whereas the Viet Cong 
irregular forces had been a centerpiece of the 1968 campaign, in the 1972 offensive the Viet 
Cong played only a minor role. In contrast to 1968, in 1972‒73 the rural areas of South 
Vietnam were mostly under clear control of the South Vietnamese government. 
Air power is part of the CORDS story in that CORDS, while a mixed military and 
civilian agency, reported to MACV and ultimately came under the command of the military 
theater commander. This meant that CORDS received air transport support from the USAF, a 
necessity for maintaining small CORDS teams in isolated areas of South Vietnam. Being tied 
into the MACV chain of command and communications net meant that CORDS provincial 
advisors, both civilians and military, could call in American and South Vietnamese air strikes 
in case of an NVA or Viet Cong attack.  
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The ability of the CORDS personnel to call for air strikes played a key role in the 
defeat of the 1972 North Vietnamese Spring Offensive. Since nearly all the American combat 
ground troops had been withdrawn from Vietnam by 1972, the NVA believed that the time 
was right for a major ground offensive. Instead of fighting the American forces that had 
decimated the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces during the 1968 Offensive, the NVA 
would now face only the South Vietnamese Army and the regional forces – forces they had 
easily beaten in the past. However, thanks to CORDS, the South Vietnamese forces were 
better trained and prepared than in the past, and CORDS personnel could still call on the very 
considerable American air power still available in the theater. The combination of effective 
South Vietnamese forces, backed up by US air power and often coordinated through CORDS 
provincial advisors, proved deadly to the North Vietnamese. Despite conducting a massive 
effort that included tanks and heavy artillery, the NVA managed to overrun only one South 
Vietnamese provincial capital – and this was later retaken (Wilbanks 2004: chap 6). 
With the NVA’s bloody setback in 1972 and the improvement of South Vietnam’s 
security situation, the US could negotiate a withdrawal of its forces from Vietnam in early 
1973, turning the war effort over to the South Vietnamese. Unfortunately, in early 1975 the 
North Vietnamese initiated a massive conventional invasion of South Vietnam, spearheaded 
by large armored and mechanised forces backed up with heavy artillery and a mobile layered 
air defence system. Unable to cope with a true blitzkrieg by regular forces, the South 
Vietnamese military collapsed – and with it, the entire country. 
Ironically, despite the myth that the United States is not effective in 
counterinsurgency operations, the Americans and South Vietnamese had actually crushed the 
guerrilla insurgents of the Viet Cong and secured the countryside for the government by 1972 
– and CORDS deserves a great deal of the credit. Yet, in the aftermath of Vietnam, few in the 
US government wanted to look at the positive lessons that came from the war – and the 
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CORDS interagency model was one of the real successes of the Vietnam War. It would be 
two decades before the interagency concept would be revived to fight a new kind of war. 
 
The Joint Interagency Task Force and the war on drugs 
With a crime epidemic at home that was fueled by drugs and the drug trade, and with major 
[entire?] nations such as Colombia and Peru becoming destabilised by the drug trade, it was 
clear by the early 1990s that something different from the traditional law enforcement model 
was needed to face a crime problem with major international implications. It is not that there 
was no effort being devoted to the war on drugs. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 
Border Patrol, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Coast Guard were all involved in 
countering the drug trade.  
The CIA and military provided intelligence, while the State Department oversaw aid 
to Latin American police forces. Yet despite a major effort by US law enforcement agencies 
the problems continued. Congress, concerned about the continuing rise of the drug trade and 
its destructive cartels, held hearings to see if a better use could be made of the efforts by the 
federal law enforcement agencies. One obvious problem was the lack of coordinated effort by 
the many agencies involved. As explained by Coast Guard Rear Admiral Andrew Granzuno 
and echoed by a host of senior officers in US Congressional hearings, ‘There is no one in 
charge’ of the drug interdiction campaign, and this was a key factor to drive some radical 
changes [insert source?]. Another factor encouraging a more concerted effort was the change 
made by the US government in looking at the drug trade as an international security issue. 
Indeed, by the early 1990s, the focus in the war on drugs turned to interdiction (reducing the 
supply), and this meant going after the production and distribution of the drugs at their source 
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and not just dealing with the drugs later as a law enforcement or border protection issue 
(Presidential Decision Directive PDD14 1996). 
With this new national security focus, the US government turned to the interagency 
concept that would become the key tool in fighting international drug trafficking. In 1994 
President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 14, National Drug Policy, that set up 
three US Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) responsible for the Latin American, 
Caribbean, and Pacific regions and would serve as organisations specifically designed to 
coordinate the counterdrug and interdiction operations. In 1997, as the US pulled forces out 
of Panama to comply with the turnover of the Panama Canal, the JIATF South 
(headquartered in Panama) was combined with the JIATF East (headquarters in Key West, 
Florida) and renamed Joint interagency Task Force-South. The J IATF was an entirely new 
organisation for the United States and was designed to formally integrate personnel and 
capabilities of the US military, the US Coast Guard (Department of Transportation), the 
Customs Service (Department of the Treasury, the DEA (Justice Department), the FBI 
(Justice Department), and intelligence agencies such as the CIA, National Security Agency 
(NSA), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Because the Caribbean region also included 
the overseas territories of America’s NATO allies France, the UK, and the Netherlands, those 
countries also became involved with the JIATF South. 
The JIATF for the counter-drug campaign had a carefully designed command and 
organisational structure that required the full integration of the civilian agencies and military. 
For example, the largest of the JIATFs, JIATF South (responsible for the Caribbean region, is 
commanded by a Coast Guard rear admiral. This makes sense, as the US Coast Guard itself is 
a hybrid organisation, serving not only as a US military force but also having civilian duties 
in regulating and policing shipping. While the Navy, as a military force, is not normally 
tasked with law enforcement duties the Coast Guard is, and Coast Guard personnel, unlike 
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Navy personnel, have arrest authority and are well trained in the duties of enforcing the law 
at sea. Other sections of the headquarters are allotted to other services and agencies.  
The deputy commander is a US Navy rear admiral, the vice director is a senior 
Customs Agency officer, another vice director is a senior FBI agent, and the chief of staff of 
the JIATF South is a US Air Force colonel. The headquarters looks much like a military 
command with a J-2 Intelligence section, a J-3 Operations section, a J-4 Logistics section, 
and a J-5 Plans section. However, the JIATF also has sections not found in a normal military 
organisation, to include a J-9 International Affairs section. Because of the nature of its 
mission the JIATF South contains specialist liaison officers from the military and intelligence 
services and also from foreign allies ‒ namely the Dutch, British, and French who provided 
naval and air units to support the task force. 
The heart of the JIATF is the operations command center where the intelligence and 
operations are fully integrated. The Task Force is able to access and analyse intelligence from 
every source: human intelligence, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and air and space 
surveillance. Intelligence is provided through the Task Force’s own assets, but mainly 
through direct liaison with law enforcement agencies and military commands. The Air Force 
liaison officer, for example, can request Air Force Space Command’s support for imagery 
and surveillance. In the intelligence center of the Task Force civilians and military personnel 
are fully integrated into functional teams. Monitoring shipping and air traffic, for instance, 
one might find a Marine sitting next to an Air Force NCO with a DIA civilian serving as the 
section leader. JIATF South has its own resources to mount operations, with naval and Coast 
Guard vessels, military aircraft, military and law enforcement personnel organised into three 
task groups to operate in sectors of the Caribbean. Allied nations are full partners in the 
mission, with a flag officer from the Netherlands commanding one of the task force groups 
involved in patrol and drug interdiction. French and British air and naval and police forces 
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also participate in the task groups (Marine Nationale 2011). However, if the situation requires 
more assets and assistance the JIATF can, as a military organisation, access available military 
units to support specific operations.  
Air power plays a central role in the work of the JIATF, mainly in the form of air and 
space reconnaissance and surveillance of the vast region. Once a likely drug shipment by sea 
or air is identified, air assets track the suspicious vessel or aircraft and often helicopter units 
are employed in the interdiction and seizure of drug shipments. For this reason the chief of 
staff slot is filled by an Air Force colonel, and Air Force liaison and intelligence personnel 
are assigned to the command center. Other Air Force assets are integrated into the Task 
Force’s three groups.  
In the more than two decades since the JIATF South and West were developed, they 
have demonstrated their value in integrating military and civilian agency assets, as well as 
foreign forces, into one highly efficient organisation. The JIATF South and West did not end 
the drug trade, but their work did noticeably increase the amount of drugs interdicted and the 
number of drug smugglers arrested. They have forced drug cartels to move to new, less 
efficient transport routes and have put pressure on the insurgent forces that used the drug 
trade as their means of finance and support. Colombia and Peru are far more stable nations 
since the more effective counterdrug strategy of the 1990s, and the JIATFs can take some of 
the credit. 
 
Air power and the JIATF in the war on terror 
The international interventions of the 1990s highlighted the need for military and civilian 
agencies to work together more effectively. The end of the Cold War did not bring the 
expected era of peace, but instead unleashed a high level of international disorder. The 
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implosion of various countries required international intervention led by military forces. 
These types of operations had been conducted before, but usually on a limited scale. 
However, the 1990s saw a series of crises erupt from Africa to Latin America to Europe and 
each crisis required a strong military response initially, with a strong follow-on response from 
civilian agencies to stabilise the country affected and assist it to restore services and 
government functions. In most cases these interventions required first dealing with large 
numbers of refugees and whole communities in dire need of medical aid and food. In the 
1990s both the US-led interventions in Panama (1990) and Haiti (1995), and the NATO-led 
interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), required the deployment of significant 
numbers of military personnel, accompanied by aid workers and civilian agencies from 
supporting governments, or put under contract by the United States and NATO. The 
interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo required long periods to stabilise the chaotic and 
lawless conditions and to assist the local populations to return to a stable civilian life.  
Neither the United States nor the European nations had an effective interagency 
doctrine or organisation to provide the command and control for military and civilian 
government agencies to operate together. The lack of a military/civilian command and 
control system meant that various ad hoc systems were thrown together that, frankly, did not 
work effectively. In the case of the US interventions in Panama and Haiti the US State 
Department, which oversees aid to foreign nations as well as law enforcement training 
missions, was completely unprepared to support the oversight and training of local law 
enforcement, was unready to assist in the rebuilding of government and other nation-building 
measures. The immediate distribution of food and provision of emergency health care was 
successful, but the long-term stability operations remained a problem (Pope 2014: 79‒81). 
Part of the problem was rivalry and competition between agencies, exacerbated by 
insufficient planning and resources for sustained aid to government.  
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As in the early years of the war on drugs, it was often unclear who was actually in 
charge. The National Security Council, charged with ensuring that military and civilian 
agencies are coordinated at the strategic level, failed to work out any effective command and 
control for military and civilian agencies (Pope 2014: 57). Unfortunately, the later 
military/civilian stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were still carried out with an ad 
hoc command and control system as multiple agencies led separate efforts with little overall 
coordination (Pope 2014: 84, 90). Another study of the problems in military/civilian agency 
coordination in the 1990s and into the 2003 Iraq War pointed out the friction over the roles of 
the agencies in stability operations as these were not clearly defined. Without a clear 
direction from the top (National Security Council) the agencies were left without clear lines 
of command and authority in conducting vital missions (Rast 2004: 247‒248). In short, the 
US military and civilian leadership were still struggling with a model of how to coordinate 
military and civilian efforts. 
Fighting the global terrorist network of al-Qaida after 2001 became a top priority of 
the United States. With al-Qaida and allied radical Islamist factions the Americans were 
dealing with a new kind of enemy. Not only were America and Coalition partners facing local 
insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, but in Iraq the Coalition forces faced well-trained and 
financed foreign fighters who had flocked to Iraq to join the local factions fighting the 
Coalition forces trying to stabilise the country in the aftermath of the 2003 conventional war 
that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. Many of the foreign fighters joined a force called al-
Qaida in Iraq under the leadership of a Jordanian jihadist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The 
professional jihadists took advantage of the chaotic situation in Iraq to increase the level of 
violence and to push Iraq into a full scale Sunni-Shia civil war that would have ended any 
hope for a stable nation.  
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Al-Qaida in Iraq could call on the global network of al-Qaida for support and 
legitimacy. Early in the conflict the United States responded by setting up a Special 
Operations task force, Task Force 714, directed to conduct operations against al-Qaida and its 
leadership throughout the area of responsibility of Central Command (CENTCOM). 
However, it was soon clear that far more than special operations and the military intelligence 
assets would be needed to fight a sophisticated international enemy that operated 
underground and worked through a network of small groups.  
In 2004 Task Force 714 was reorganised as a JIATF that would include not only 
military personnel from all the services, but also civilian personnel from the CIA and DIA. 
As with the JIATFs conducting the drug interdiction campaign, the civilian and military 
intelligence personnel were fully intermixed in functional teams and CIA paramilitary and 
support personnel were integrated into the operational and support forces. Again, as with the 
anti-drug interagency task forces, the intelligence and operations centers were combined into 
one large operations center. This meant that priority intelligence information developed by 
the collection and analysis teams could be passed on to operations immediately. While often 
missions were conducted after a careful planning process, in war conditions the intelligence 
acquired sometimes demanded immediate action; otherwise opportunities to capture or kill 
terrorist leaders and groups might be lost.  
The United States set up two interagency task forces to focus on different parts of the 
war on terrorism. JIATF East was based at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan and focused on 
al-Qaida leadership in Central Asia. JIATF West was based at the huge Balad Air Base forty 
miles north of Baghdad and focused on fighting the al-Qaida forces in Iraq. Both were under 
the direction of General Stanley McChrystal, a highly experienced special operations officer 
who had a knack for unusual missions. In his memoirs General McChrystal described the 
long process of building the JIATFs into effective teams that could process large amounts of 
18 
 
intelligence and act quickly upon it. Like the counter-drug interagency task forces, the JIATF 
in Iraq had its own Special Forces units assigned to it, but the effective liaison with the other 
services also meant that air and ground units in the theater could be immediately tasked for 
missions. Air power provided an essential capability to the JIATF West in the form of 
surveillance through aircraft and mostly unmanned aerial vehicles, whose long endurance 
provided the capability to observe and follow targets for twelve or more hours at a time. 
When raids were required helicopter-borne special operations teams were at hand and aircraft 
could be tasked at a moment’s notice. Starting with a very limited intelligence picture of Iraq 
and the al-Qaida threat, by 2005 the JIATF West was becoming effective in developing 
focused analysis that gave the Coalition Forces an accurate view of the terrorist networks. 
This intelligence enabled the strike forces to take down key parts of the al-Qaida organisation 
(McChrystal 2013). 
A key event in June 2006 demonstrated the worth of the  and the importance of air 
power in the surveillance and strike roles. The leader of al Qaeda in Iraq had long been the 
main target of JIATF West. One mullah known to be a close advisor of al Zarqawi and to 
meet with him regularly was put under surveillance by an umanned aerial system (UAS). A 
young civilian analyst working on the surveillance team noticed the mullah moving out with 
several associates. Immediately the other surveillance teams were alerted and strike forces 
put on standby. Other surveillance aircraft were diverted immediately to support this high 
priority mission. Al-Zarqawi’s mullah drove some distance from Baghdad and met al-
Zarqawi in a small restaurant.  
Two groups emerged and climbed into two vehicles which took off in different 
directions. Helicopter-borne Special Forces teams intercepted one vehicle and captured the 
drivers, but they were low level operatives. The other vehicle with the mullah/advisor took a 
side road to an isolated farm compound. Knowing that this was al-Zarqawi’s headquarters 
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and as it was nearing dusk, and would have required a large force to properly surround the 
compound at night, the decision was made to call in an F-16 air strike, which pulverised the 
farm house with two 500lb precision bombs. A Special Forces team arrived minutes later to 
find al Zarqawi dying as well as a trove of documents in the compound. The loss of al 
Qaeda’s charismatic leader was a major blow to the foreign jihadi forces operating in Iraq. 
The strike on al Zarqawi showed how the JIATF, which fully integrated intelligence with 
operations and had the right mix of air assets available, could put a complex operation 
together with no notice and rapidly adjust the mission to achieve full success (McChrystal 
2015: 130‒131, 235‒242). No other kind of organisation can employ this kind of flexibility 
and integrate air power so efficiently into operations. 
 
Conclusion 
Interagency operations have become one of the major tools in modern conflicts with irregular 
enemies. The interagency organisation has proven its worth as a means of effective command 
and control for air, ground and sea assets. Western nations will see extensive use of 
interagency operations in the future and air power will be a major part of these operations. 
However, in the years since the Cold War some key lessons have been learned about 
interagency operations. First of all, civilian and military agencies do not naturally work well 
with each other and one can expect considerable organisational friction in any interagency 
operation. Secondly, building an effective interagency organisation requires leaders who can 
understand civilian and military cultures and who are willing to work well outside their 
comfort zone to integrate different agencies into one well-running organisation. Third, ad hoc 
interagency organisations have not been effective. To use all the military and civilian 
assistance [participants? assets?] well and to ensure full cooperation from the participating 
agencies, the joint interagency task force needs to be clearly focused and have a clearly 
20 
 
defined mission. The tasks of all the participating agencies have to be carefully spelled out to 
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